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Abstract 
Extreme narcissistic organizations are unable to behave ethi-
cally because they lack a moral identity. While such organiza-
tions are not necessarily unethical intentionally, they become 
self-obsessed and use a sense of entitlement, self-aggrandize-
ment, denial, and rationalizations to justify anything they 
do. Extreme narcissistic organizations might develop formal 
ethics programs, but such programs will have little effect on 
behavior.  
Keywords: organizational narcissism, virtue  
 
I think what I didn’t understand when I was young 
was that corporations have personalities just like 
humans do. It is possible for companies to be 
virtuous.  
—Larry Brilliant, Executive Director, Google.org  
 
 
Introduction  
 
Ethics is not missing from corporate life, but it can 
be obscured or marginalized (Roberts, 2001) by the 
character of the corporation itself. That is, a corpo-
rate system lacking a virtuous identity can manipu-
late and constrain moral agency (Nielsen, 2006). We 
define moral agency as the capacity (1) to make judg-
ments about the goodness and badness of organiza-
tional behavior and (2) to take actions that comport 
with moral standards. However, rather than being 
the result of bad intentions or faulty judgments, un-
ethical behavior can be a consequence of a corpora-
tion’s self-concept; a consequence of how it defines 
itself.  
Our argument is two-pronged. First, we argue 
that an organization’s identity, operating as an ana-
log to an individual’s personality (Whetten, 2006), 
essentially determines whether or not that organi-
zation will be a moral agent (MacIntyre, 2007). Sec-
ond we argue that organizations can adopt collec-
tive narcissistic identities that will produce wrong 
(i.e., non-virtuous) behavior. This happens because 
the organization’s narcissistic identity—including the 
corresponding motive to protect its identity—is more 
powerful than a motive to behave morally.  
 
 
Organizational identities  
 
Organizations have identities. They are distin-
guishable; they have names, occupy physical space, 
and are accorded legal rights much the same as peo-
ple. Whetton (2006) defines organizational identity as 
the “… central and enduring attributes of an organi-
zation that distinguish it from other organizations” 
(p. 220). These attributes allow the organization to le-
gitimize and substantiate claims of uniqueness that 
has functional value in terms of its ability to both de-
fine a competitive domain and to present itself as an 
idealized actor within that domain (i.e., this is what 
we are; this is who we are). The attributes structure 
activity in the organization as shown in its core pro-
grams, policies and procedures, and they also pro-
vide a reference point for decision making and com-
munication (i.e., this is what we do; this is how we do 
it). This reference point comes to be the foundation 
upon which the organization acts – an embodiment 
of its assumptions about the world and the organiza-
tion’s role in it. When the internally generated refer-
ence point acquires sufficient mass, it can partially or 
completely eclipse the reference point that prevails 
more broadly external to the organization.  
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Within the boundaries of an identity, an organi-
zation develops distinctive preferences, commit-
ments, and practices (Whetton, 2006) that reflect col-
lectively shared assumptions or ideologies about 
its identity. That is, organizations develop belief 
systems or cultures that help the members under-
stand behaviorally who they are as a collectivity, 
how they got that way, what they should be, and 
how they should behave (Hatch and Schultz, 2000; 
Schein, 1992; Trice and Beyer, 1993). An organiza-
tion’s identity emerges and is shaped as it solves 
adaptation and integration problems, and the or-
ganization’s culture, as an analogue to personality, 
will find ways to display those central and endur-
ing attributes that make up its identity. Culture is 
the social mechanism that will transfer the organiza-
tion’s identity to new members as the “correct” way 
to perceive, think, and feel (Schein, 1992, p. 4). As 
Trice and Beyer (1993) put it, being part of a culture 
means “…believing what others believe and doing 
as they do” (p.5). Among other central and enduring 
attributes, cultures develop distinctive mechanisms 
to cope with uncertainties (Trice and Beyer, 1993) 
and thus protect their identities.  
Brown (1997) argues that collective entities have 
a need for self-esteem. Based on the work of Tajfel 
and Turner (cf. Tajfel, 1972; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; 
Turner, 1985), Brown contends that “… organiza-
tions consist in the common social identification of 
participating individuals acting as their organiza-
tion, and that organizational self-esteem consists of 
the collective self-esteem of individuals acting as the 
organization” (1997, 649). Organizations, as social 
categories, exist in their members’ common aware-
ness of their membership, and so come to take on 
identities that are parts of their members’ identities, 
needs, and behaviors. When organization members 
are motivated to preserve the part of their self-im-
age derived from their social category, they are, col-
lectively, regulating the self-esteem of the social cat-
egory – the organization. Thus, the organization can 
regulate collective self-esteem with ego-defensive 
behaviors, not only to preserve identity, but also 
to enhance the legitimacy of the collective category 
(Brown, 1997).  
Our notion of identity and regulation of collective 
self-esteem is consistent with an Institutional The-
ory view of organizations (cf. Powell and DiMag-
gio, 1991). Institutional Theory examines the pro-
cesses by which structures including schemas, rules, 
norms, and routines become established as authori-
tative guidelines for social behavior. These processes 
are argued to be deep and resilient aspects of so-
cial structure (Scott, 2004). Social structures are then 
both imposed on and upheld by the actors within the 
structure. Thus, an institution becomes encoded into 
an actor through a socialization process and, once in-
ternalized, is transformed into a script of patterned 
behavior. When the actor behaves according to the 
script, the institution is enacted (Bjorck, 2004). Insti-
tutional Theory allows conceiving of an organization 
as exhibiting properties of supra-individual units 
of analysis that cannot be reduced to the direct con-
sequences of an individual’s attributes or motives 
(Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Moreover, the institu-
tion will develop scripts, rules, and routines that are 
consistent with its identity and articulate what is and 
what is not ethical behavior.  
 
 
Moral identity  
 
Virtue Theory argues that morality is a function 
of an entity’s character: What the entity is and has 
will enable dispositions to act in virtuous/unvirtu-
ous ways (MacIntyre, 2007). Formal organizations 
can function like a moral person, and so be consid-
ered to possess an institutional character replete with 
institution- level virtues and vices (Moore and Bea-
dle, 2006). Weaver (2006) has argued that entities, 
including organizations, can possess a network of 
moral traits rooted in self-concepts and manifested 
in actions. A moral identity exists when the entity is 
“…centrally oriented toward a collection of moral 
traits that both define (what) one is and yield tenden-
cies toward paradigmatically moral action” (p. 345). 
Moral identity is subject to contextual influences and 
to the waxing and waning of its own salience, but its 
strength will match the degree to which it is a central 
part of the self concept.  
Moral identity formed at higher levels capture cog-
nitive schemas that direct thought and action and ar-
range people into roles (Weaver, 2006). These higher-
level identities influence the identities of lower-level 
entities such that organizational identities influence 
individual identities. For example, organizational 
identities influence the identities of business units, 
departments, groups, and ultimately individuals. The 
cognitive and symbolic order provided by the orga-
nization’s identity both guides and delimits the be-
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havior of individuals acting on the organization’s be-
half. Thus, even though individuals or groups may 
be responsible for making decisions in organiza-
tions, those decisions will tend to be consistent with 
the larger system’s moral identity (Weaver, 2006). 
Therefore, unethical behavior can emerge from orga-
nizations unintentionally, even without awareness. 
Unless virtue is a central part of the organization’s 
self-concept, ethical behavior will never be consid-
ered an appropriate metric or standard to judge the 
outcomes of decisions.  
 
 
Organizational narcissism  
 
Narcissism is a term that generally connotes a per-
son who possesses an extreme love of self, a grandi-
ose sense of self-importance, and a powerful sense of 
entitlement. The American Psychiatric Association 
(2000) defines narcissism as a personality disorder 
characterized by “a pervasive pattern of grandiosity, 
need for admiration, and lack of empathy… and is 
present in a variety of contexts” (p. 717). The Manual 
suggests that narcissistic personality disorder is indi-
cated by a person exhibiting a range of self-centered 
behaviors,1 although a diagnosis of narcissistic per-
sonality disorder is somewhat imprecise and mostly 
the result of a clinician’s judgment.  
Narcissistic behaviors are generally seen as ego-
defense mechanisms used to bolster a fragile sense 
of self. Organizations, like people, are also motivated 
to protect their collective sense of identity and legit-
imacy, and, like people, can also sometimes engage 
in extreme narcissistic behavior. This narcissistic re-
sponse is a coping mechanism intended to protect 
and preserve the organization’s identity, but extreme 
manifestations can lead to dysfunction, even ruin. 
People in organizations can collectively get off-track 
in their efforts to protect the system’s identity by be-
having in ways that reinforce an exaggerated sense of 
system-self, and by ruthlessly exploiting both other 
organizations and members of their own system 
(Brown, 1997).  
Organizations can create structures and processes 
(enduring attributes) that will reinforce and ex-
tend a sense of both identity and legitimacy (Brown, 
1997; Ganesh, 2003). Such efforts to institutionalize 
identity are necessary to maintain the organization, 
and should be seen as normal; however, institution-
alizing an extreme narcissistic identity can prove to 
be problematic. The extreme narcissistic organiza-
tional identity seeks to justify and legitimize itself at 
all costs, with scant reference to market accountabil-
ity, civic responsibility, or ethical concerns (Ganesh, 
2003). Extreme narcissists are entirely self-absorbed, 
out of touch, and not “reality based.” The extreme 
narcissistic organization will institutionalize domi-
nance, control, entitlement, and exploitation (Greg-
ory, 1999) to reinforce its maladaptive identity. 
Thus, it is possible to observe organizational attri-
butes and activities that can be used to label a sys-
tem as an extreme narcissist, although notions of 
virtue and ethical behavior likely will not be among 
those attributes.  
For example, Stein (2003) suggests that extreme 
organizational narcissism will possess five charac-
teristic attributes. First, members of a narcissistic or-
ganization will believe their organization to be ex-
traordinarily special and unique. This belief does not 
reflect normal feelings of pride and accomplishment, 
but is instead highly exaggerated to the point of de-
lusion. Second, a powerful sense of self aggrandize-
ment and entitlement leads to a kind of unconscious 
imperialism or an unconscious omnipotence: The or-
ganization is all powerful and anything of potency is 
felt to legitimately belong to it. Such an organization 
cannot recognize that anything of value might exist 
outside its boundaries. Third, the organization be-
lieves itself to be omniscient; that is, it has access to 
all information, both internal and external, that is rel-
evant to the organization. Fourth, the delusion of the 
narcissistic organization allows it not only to be dis-
missive of other organizations, people and informa-
tion, but also to treat them with a kind of triumphant 
contempt. Fifth, these attributes are so pervasive that 
they become permanently embedded in organiza-
tional functioning (Stein, 2003).  
Brown (1997) has argued that extreme narcissis-
tic organizations use denial to cope with conflict and 
stress. For example, such organizations deny facts 
about themselves through spokespeople, annual re-
ports, and myths. They develop plausible and ac-
ceptable justifications for their actions through ra-
tionalization. They self-aggrandize by endowing 
themselves with a sense of rightness and making 
claims of their uniqueness. This is done in myriad 
ways. For example, they commission flattering cor-
porate histories; executives make speeches embed-
ded with claims of uniqueness; and they deploy 
their office layouts and architecture as expressions 
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of status, prestige, and vanity. Extreme narcissistic 
organizations aggressively use annual reports and 
media campaigns to promulgate self-serving expla-
nations of their actions. They assume that they are 
entitled to continued success, and that they are en-
titled to exploit resources, people, and other organi-
zations in the service of that success (Brown, 1997). 
Clearly, such extreme organization narcissists will 
not be inclined to engage in virtuous practice (Ma-
cIntyre, 2007).  
 
 
Organizational narcissism and misconduct  
 
Ketola (2006) has shown that an organization uses 
ego-defense mechanisms to protect the integrity of its 
personality, even at the expense of sacrificing the mo-
rality of its actions. It is more important for organiza-
tions to feel that they are moral persons than to face 
the immorality of their actions (Ketola, 2006, p. 149). 
Using data from an oil company trying to cope with 
an oil spill, Ketola elaborates on what she terms cor-
porate psychological defense. When facing accusa-
tions of misconduct, organizations use denial, repres-
sion, and omnipotent fantasies to fend off dealing 
with the facts of their own actions. They use rational-
izations to admit responsibility, but deny any harm 
resulting from their unethical behavior. They use ex-
cuses to avoid taking responsibility.  
Stein (2003) has argued that the near collapse of 
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 
was caused not by a lack of information or poor de-
cision processes, but by its own narcissism. LTCM’s 
partners displayed denial of reality in believing that 
they possessed knowledge and capabilities far be-
yond those of any other hedge-fund managers. They 
believed themselves to be both omnipotent and om-
niscient, and this belief manifested itself at the so-
ciotechnical core of the firm, where decisions were 
based on a belief that LTCM’s Value at Risk calcu-
lations allowed it to predict and control the future. 
This led the partners to display entitlement by tak-
ing enormous risks in areas of investment such 
as the Russian economy in which it had no previ-
ous experience. Between January and August 1998, 
LTCM’s leverage ratio reached 50:1 when 2:1 was 
the industry norm.  
In their book about the fall of Arthur Andersen, 
Toffler and Reingold (2003) described how a once 
ethical corporate culture unraveled as it became in-
creasingly narcissistic. Company founder, Arthur 
Andersen, was unfailingly clear about the need for 
a strong ethical culture. The company mantra was 
“think straight, talk straight,” and a favored, culture-
shaping story related how early in his career Ander-
sen refused to approve an important client’s inaccu-
rate books. Andersen died in 1947, but his successors 
continued to cultivate a virtuous culture that valued 
integrity, trustworthiness, and ethical conduct. By 
the 1990s, however, the firm was growing and prof-
itable because of its consulting business, not auditing, 
and the attitudes and values of the consulting side 
came to dominate. Although Toffler does not use the 
term “narcissism,” she describes how a sense of en-
titlement, denial, self-aggrandizement, and rational-
ization replaced integrity and trustworthiness as the 
culture’s core values, and those values translated into 
practices by which clients were routinely catered to 
and overcharged.  
An important point here is that Toffler notes that 
the Arthur Andersen organization had formal ethical 
standards and ethics training. It even had a consult-
ing group that helped other companies manage their 
ethics. But, inside the company, concern about eth-
ics had pretty much disappeared. Narcissistically, the 
culture assumed itself to be ethical in all ways and 
therefore did not have “to worry about this stuff.” At 
Arthur Andersen, just like its client Enron, a narcis-
sistic identity predisposed the organizations toward 
unethical and illegal behavior. Neither system pos-
sessed a virtuous character.  
Duchon and Burns (2007) have provided evi-
dence that Enron itself possessed an extreme nar-
cissistic identity, characterized by a sense of en-
titlement, self-aggrandizement, and denial. For 
example, Enron developed an organizational cul-
ture possessed of a powerful sense of entitlement 
where lavish, even wasteful, spending was seen as 
not merely normal, but necessary. Such spending 
was necessary to the extent it allowed the organi-
zation to protect and preserve its identity. The com-
pany installed itself in an architecturally grand (and 
expensive) building, and it was proud to pay $100 
million for the naming rights to the Houston As-
tros baseball team’s stadium. Data and advice about 
bad decisions and faulty investments were rou-
tinely ignored or explained away. Illegal business 
practices became so much a part of everyday life 
that they essentially disappeared from the collective 
consciousness.  
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Extreme narcissism was also displayed at Salo-
mon Brothers in the 1980s, where both clients and 
employees were routinely exploited. For example, 
a reign of terror existed inside the company, where 
bond traders played on sales staff anxieties by reg-
ularly floating rumors that, in order to save money, 
all sales people would be fired. The sales staff them-
selves felt entitled to tell customers any kind of 
story in order to make a sale. Senior management 
felt entitled to seigniorial privileges. For example, 
they enjoyed a private elevator that only went to 
their floor in the building, and they only commu-
nicated with staff over the phone. Senior manage-
ment also practiced a collective denial that all was 
well even though deregulation had thrown all of 
Wall Street into a tailspin (Duchon and Burns, 2007). 
The point is that both companies institutionalized a 
narcissistic identity that essentially gave permission 
for unethical and illegal behavior. Neither company 
survived.  
 
 
Why narcissism defeats formal ethics programs  
 
An organization’s identity will shape its decision 
making processes and management practices by es-
tablishing what is normal, what is acceptable, and 
what is desirable: “this is what we are, this is what 
we do.” Extreme narcissistic organizations develop 
self-obsessed identities such that collective self-ag-
grandizement, a profound sense of entitlement, and 
denial become normal. Such an identity makes cyni-
cism, exploitation, and a lack of empathy acceptable. 
Such an identity is morally flawed: It does not con-
tain a predisposition to act virtuously.  
Ironically, extreme narcissistic organizations will 
likely establish formal ethics programs, although the 
programs will not have much effect on curbing un-
ethical behavior. Formal ethics programs are an im-
portant aspect of self presentation; a way to show the 
world that the company is modern in every way. But 
Roberts (2001) has noted that only the appearance of 
ethical concern is important. So, driven by a need for 
self-aggrandizement, the extreme narcissistic orga-
nization will hire (expensive) consultants, create an 
elaborate program, and make sure the program re-
ceives much favorable comment in the press. The 
program will become a corporate bragging point; an-
other way of proclaiming greatness. But, as Roberts 
(2001) notes, the “work of ethics” will go on purely 
at the surface, leaving the operational interior free to 
pursue its usual agenda.  
But self-aggrandizement is not the only reason 
an extreme narcissistic organization might establish 
ethics programs. The program can be used exploi-
tively as a kind of legal camouflage. The presence 
of such a program can by itself be used as a defense 
against accusations of unethical conduct, thus ex-
ploiting legal conventions. More importantly, the 
mere presence of the programs shifts the responsi-
bility for ethical behavior away from cultural norms 
and onto the individuals who have been trained in 
the programs (Roberts, 2001). Ethical lapses can then 
be blamed on errant individuals, thus exploiting the 
system’s own members. In either case the presence 
or absence of virtue is never questioned because 
such questions would be seen as attacks on the or-
ganization’s identity. Exploitation was used to pre-
empt such attacks.  
Extreme narcissistic organizations want to ap-
pear ethical because appearing ethical feeds their 
narcissism, and so the costs of creating formal eth-
ics programs are small compared to the ego-de-
fense benefits. But such programs are instrumental 
for the narcissistic identity, not ethical conduct, and 
therefore will not much affect the behavioral status 
quo. Treviño and Brown (2004) have pointed out 
that ethics programs need to be part of a large, co-
ordinated cultural system that supports ethical con-
duct everyday: Ethics “walk” needs to match eth-
ics “talk.” That is, ethics programs need to be part 
of a virtuous practice (Moore and Beadle, 2006), 
part of the essential character of the organization’s 
identity.  
 
 
Discussion  
 
Extreme narcissistic organizations’ cultures are 
excessively ego-centric and exploitive. Their mem-
bership will obsessively employ a sense of entitle-
ment, self-aggrandizement, denial, and rational-
izations to justify their behavior and so protect the 
collective’s identity. Such organizations are not in-
tentionally unethical – they are likely to have for-
mal ethics programs – but concerns about ethical, or 
even legal, behavior will receive little more than lip 
service. Such cultures, like those at Enron, Salomon 
Brothers, or Arthur Andersen, can then drift into un-
ethical or illegal behavior, and these behaviors be-
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come part of everyday life; they become normal. The 
organization then formally uses the defense mech-
anisms (rationalizations, denial, entitlement, etc.) to 
defend and justify its behavior because unethical be-
havior is now part of the collective identity (“this 
is who we are; this is what we do”), which must be 
preserved.  
Once unethical behavior becomes institutional-
ized, individuals in the organization will, ironically, 
think of themselves as moral and continue their un-
ethical behavior without pangs of conscience (Anand 
et al., 2005). To an outsider, these practices are obvi-
ously wrong, but insiders who have internalized the 
culture’s logic cannot see anything wrong. Insiders 
see themselves and the behavior of the organizations 
they work for as good and right. To question or deny 
these propositions is to threaten the collective iden-
tity, which cannot be tolerated.  
Extreme narcissistic organizations cannot behave 
ethically because they do not have a moral identity, 
i.e., a self-concept organized around a set of moral 
traits. Without a moral identity, an organization has 
no way to decide how to behave because Virtue The-
ory’s essential question is “Who am I?,” rather than 
“What principle should I follow?” Fundamentally, 
extreme narcissistic organizations do not possess a 
disposition of virtue.  
In contrast to the extreme narcissist, however, it 
is possible for an organization to possess a virtuous 
character (Moore and Beadle, 2006). Such an organi-
zation would, first, be aware that it is founded on and 
sustains the particular business practice2 it houses. 
The extreme narcissist loses sight of its essential prac-
tice as it becomes increasingly self-absorbed and de-
fensive. Second, the virtuous organization encour-
ages excellence in pursuit of its practice. Excellence 
means accepting the authority of standards and the 
inadequacy of one’s own performance (MacIntyre, 
2007), something the extreme narcissist is fundamen-
tally incapable of doing. Third, the virtuous organi-
zation would focus on external goods (e.g., profit or 
reputation) as both a necessary and worthwhile func-
tion of the organization, but only to the extent neces-
sary for the sustenance and development of the prac-
tice. The extreme narcissist so desires external goods 
that it will behave unethically to obtain them. Finally, 
the virtuous organization would be able to resist the 
corrupting power of institutions in its environment 
(Moore and Beadle, 2006). The extreme narcissist is 
the supreme exploiter and, as such, is itself a corrupt 
institution.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Some organizations enable unethical behavior be-
cause they lack a virtuous character. We have argued 
that an organization’s identity (Whetten, 2006) essen-
tially determines whether or not that organization 
will be a moral agent (MacIntyre, 2007). We also ar-
gued that organizations can adopt narcissistic iden-
tities that will produce wrong (i.e., non-virtuous) 
behavior.  
Ethical behavior enacted from a deep sense of vir-
tuous identity implies substantive rather than sym-
bolic commitment to what Moore and Beadle (2006) 
term a “just purpose.” For example, a virtuous or-
ganization develops a balanced power structure 
that ensures that the desires of particular constitu-
encies are not privileged over others, thus damp-
ening tendencies toward displays of entitlement. 
Decision making processes will enable rational, real-
ity-based, critical dialogue to counter bias, rational-
izations and denial. The organization will be char-
acterized by displays of courage, justice, trust, and 
truthfulness (Moore and Beadle, 2006), and so coun-
ter self-aggrandizing displays. In contrast, an orga-
nization with an extreme narcissistic identity will be 
unable to realize, much less express, such substance. 
An extreme narcissistic organization is so focused 
on its own anxieties that it will be unable to articu-
late a just purpose.  
Such an organization might devise rules in an at-
tempt to approximate an ethical presentation, but this 
gesture is at best symbolic. The rules may address 
symptoms, but they will not confront the fundamen-
tal issue: the narcissistic identity. At worst, the rules 
feed and exaggerate the culture’s preoccupation with 
itself by enabling excuses and wishful thinking. Con-
sider that, over time, the formal ethics program resid-
ing within a narcissistic identity does not expose and 
remedy ethical lapses. Rather, it will “find” evidence 
that the organization in fact behaves ethically. In both 
the best, and worst cases, the organization with a nar-
cissistic identity confuses the image of virtue with the 
authentic practice of virtue.   
 
… Everyone seemed fixated on the same concept, 
which not coincidentally allowed them to declare 
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victory. Just find the bad apples, punish them, and 
everything will be fine. This, I believe, is wishful 
and dangerous, if simple and direct, thinking. It 
precludes examining destructive corporate cultures 
and instituting real change.  
—Toffler & Reingold, Final Accounting, p. 229  
 
 
Notes  
 
1. The DSM-IV classifies someone who suffers from nar-
cissistic personality disorder as having at least five of the 
following characteristics: (1) an exaggerated sense of self-
importance (e.g., exaggerates achievements and talents, 
expects to be recognized as superior without commen-
surate achievements); (2) Preoccupation with fantasies 
of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal 
love; (3) Believes he is “special” and can only be under-
stood by, or should associate with, other special or high-
status people (or institutions); (4) Requires excessive ad-
miration; (5) Has a sense of entitlement; (6) Selfishly takes 
advantage of others to achieve his own ends; (7) Lacks 
empathy; (8) Is often envious of others or believes that 
others are envious of him; (9) Shows arrogant, haughty, 
patronizing, or contemptuous behaviors or attitudes.  
2. The notion of practice comes from MacIntyre (2007). A 
practice is defined as “any coherent and complex form of 
socially established cooperative human activity through 
which goods internal to that form of activity are realized 
in the course of trying to achieve those standards of ex-
cellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive 
of, that form of activity, with the result that human pow-
ers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the 
ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.” 
(p. 187)  
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